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20 NOV 1984

ODP-84-1727

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

VIA: Deputy Director of Administration

FROM:
Director of Data Processing

SUBJECT: Report of Audit of Office of Data Processing
For the Period 1 May 1982 - 31 May 1984 (S)

REFERENCE: Memo for D/ODP fm C/AS, dtd 25 Oct 84,
Same Subject (ODP-84-1607)

1. The following are ODP's actions on the recommendations contained in the referenced report:

Recommendation No. 1: Develop and maintain a comprehensive disaster recovery plan.

ODP Action: We recognize the lack of a disaster recovery plan as a serious shortfall. Consequently, in previous years we submitted budget initiatives for a backup computer center, but were unsuccessful in defending them through the budget process. In FY 1986, this requirement is being addressed in the Office of Communications' Systems Survivability Initiative.

Without a backup computer facility, developing a comprehensive disaster recovery plan would prove to be a fruitless exercise--the plan would simply be overtaken by the specifics of the disaster. However, we are doing some things in our normal course of business which will help make future planning easier--purchasing hardware which will be compatible across our centers; minimizing operating system differences; providing the facility to place critical applications under production control; and, backing up our systems routinely including off-site storage.

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While even these simple activities can be construed to provide us with some recovery capability, it would be naive to assume any capability would survive a true disaster. The cornerstone of a comprehensive plan is off-site control of both the hardware and software resources.

Recommendation No. 2: Use ACF2 to verify authorization to check out ODP tapes.

ODP Action: We are investigating the use of ACF2, as well as other facilities, to verify authorization to check out our tapes.

Recommendation No. 3: Conduct annual tape inventories and retain applicable documentation for audit.

ODP Action: Processing Systems Group will conduct an annual Tape Library inventory during the first quarter of each calendar year.

Recommendation No. 4: Update and maintain the Tape Management Catalog.

ODP Action: The Tape Management Catalog is being updated. The maintenance procedures for the catalog are also being updated.

Recommendation No. 5: Improve minidisk access controls.

ODP Action: We have begun the time and resource intensive process of defining user-written disk access authorizations. Because the effort is costly, we are also investigating alternative methods.

Recommendation No. 6: Conduct an inventory of WANG equipment and update the accountable property records accordingly.

ODP Action: Our Logistics Staff is conducting an inventory of WANG equipment. Upon its completion, property records will be updated and maintained by this staff.

Recommendation No. 7: Update and maintain the formal and informal records of lease/purchase equipment.

ODP Action: Lease/purchase equipment records have been updated and will be kept current.

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Recommendation No. 8: Establish consolidated memorandum receipt accounts for in-use property.

ODP Action: Consolidated memorandum receipt accounts for in-use property have been established.


Recommendation No. 9: Reconcile lease/purchase information in the Logistics Branch to data in the Resource Acquisition Management Staff.

ODP Action: Lease/purchase information in the Logistics Branch has been reconciled with that in the Resource Acquisition Management Staff.

Recommendation No. 10: Appoint a WANG systems manager.

ODP Action: The Chief, Logistics Staff is the WANG systems manager and will institute appropriate procedures for maintaining property records of WANG equipment. (See Recommendation No. 6 Above) (S)

2. If you or your staff have any questions on this matter, please call



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cc: IG
O/Compt/BMG

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SUBJECT: Report of Audit of Office of Data Processing
For the Period 1 May 1982 - 31 May 1984

25X1 C/P&PG/MS/ODP [REDACTED] 16 Nov 84)

Distribution:

Original - Addressees
1 - Inspector General
1 - O/Compt/BMG
2 - O/D/ODP
2 - ODP Registry
1 - MS File (Audit of ODP)
1 - MS Chrono

ODP STAFF SUMMARY SHEET

SUBJECT:

Report of Audit of Office of Data Processing
For the Period 1 May 1982 - 31 May 1984

PURPOSE OF ACTION:

D/ODP Approval/Signature

ACTION OFFICER (Incl. Ext.)

REFERENCES:

Memo for D/ODP fm C/AS, dtd 25 Oct 84,
Same Subject (ODP-84-L607)

RESOURCE PACKAGE & COSTS (If applicable):

THIS PAPER IS FOR YOUR:

COMPONENT/ OFFICER	INFORMATION/ COMMENT	CONCURRENCE	APPROVAL/ SIGNATURE	INITIALS	DATE
C/MS	X			78	11/17
EXO/ODP	X			D	11/20
DD/ODP	X			Co	11/20
D/ODP			X	15/	20 NOV 1984

DISCUSSION:

Dail, & Ed,
I had several telephone conversations with [redacted] regarding the Disaster Recovery response. I tried to convey to him what was behind our answer. Further, we discussed that this topic is a perennial issue raised & ODP would appreciate any help the Audit Staff might give us on the Budget front. [redacted] said that he would surface the issue with Jim Taylor -- even suggested our response would be ^{seen by Jim} ~~primary~~.
[redacted] I discussed this answer in detail -- he thinks it ~~is~~ a good response. What do you think?
I do too!!
GHD

ADD TO OFFICIAL FILE YES ___ NO ___

Explanatory Notes

Subject: Self-explanatory - include ODP number if applicable.

Purpose: What will action accomplish, e.g., "Reply to letter from OMB," "Obtain DDA approval to spend \$100M," "Comply with periodic reporting requirements," etc.

Action Officer: Name, organization, extension.

References: List of pertinent references. Copies should be attached in order listed.

Resource Package and Costs: Identify the Resource Package and total costs for each fiscal year if the action involves funds.

Routing: Who should see the action, whether for information, comment, concurrence, or signature/approval. The individual reviewing the action should initial and date where indicated. Place an "x" under the appropriate column for each component. If concurrences are contained on record copy of action, simply refer to the action.

Discussion: Narrative discussion of action - what led up to the action, why is it necessary, what do you want done. The pertinent references should be explained insofar as they relate to this action. If the action itself contains all this information, simply refer to the action.

Signature of Action Officer: Sign and date form.

Classification: Mark at the top and bottom of page, as appropriate.

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DATE: November 15, 1984

STAT NOTE TO [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Audit Report

Tom-

STAT I asked [REDACTED] for comments on the report, since as C/OSD she is
STAT most directly involved, and her comments are appended. I also talked to
[REDACTED] concerning compatibility of the centers, and he agreed
that with the exception of MVS/XA, which currently runs only in
Northside, there should be no major differences. I have appended his
comments also. We (SEG) have not really been much involved in any
disaster planning exercises, so I'm not sure how much has been done to
identify priority applications, etc.

Ro

STAT *** APPENDED BY: [REDACTED] ON: November 15, 1984 AT: 12:51 PM ***

DATE: November 15, 1984

STAT NOTE TO: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: AUDIT Report

I would suggest the following wording change to the ODP Action on
Recommendation #2:

ODP is investigating the use of ACF2 or another facility to
verify authorization to check out ODP tapes.

I don't know why they said ACF2 could only be used to solve part of the
problem consequently I think the above is a better statement.

kp

STAT *** APPENDED BY: [REDACTED] ON: November 15, 1984 AT: 12:51 PM ***

DATE: November 15, 1984

STAT NOTE TO: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Report of Audit of ODP

Concerning recommendation 1 (disaster recovery), I think that the

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recommendation could be take two ways:

- a) offsite backup.
- b) running work in different centers.

In both cases, someone needs to define just what 'important work' needs to be run. This should be C&AG's responsibility. They run most of the critical work as well as all of the major (corporate) database systems. They also handle all backup copies of disks (the DBCC for GIMS and SAB for VM/MVS).

Since we are now running multiple centers with both MVS and VM, I think that we have been forced to a great deal of compatability between centers just for minimizing our own work. This has had the side effect of having systems which will permit us to run any of our applications on any of the systems.

The biggest problem I forsee is that compatable disk types may not be available in all centers. For example, GIMS in Ruffing Center currently runs on 3330's (converting very soon to 3380's). We do not have 3330's in Special or Northside Centers.

As far as the offsite backup, this will depend on money as Gail has indicated. However, we currently support VM at W2 as well as VM and MVS at the DIAC. Whether the DIAC systems have sufficient compatability is not known.

STAT Although we could theoretically restore our systems from tapes we have sent [] I have very large reservations as to how long this would take and if it would really work. Although the tapes are at [] it is not clear to me that we have adequate documentation of just what is on the tapes so that we could actually rebuild our systems. STAT

As far as the other recommendations and the responses, I have no additional comments.

Gene

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ODP-84-1607

25 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Data Processing

VIA: Inspector General

FROM:
Chief, Audit Staff

SUBJECT: Report of Audit of Office of Data Processing
For the Period 1 May 1982 - 31 May 1984

1. Subject report is attached for your review. Please advise me of action taken on the recommendations contained in the report.

2. We appreciate the cooperation and assistance extended the auditors during the audit.



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Distribution:

Original - D/ODP

1 - DDA

1 - O/Compt/BMG

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S E C R E T

WARNING NOTICE

REPORT OF AUDIT
Office of Data Processing

For the Period
1 May 1982 to 31 May 1984

SUMMARY

1. Financial and logistical internal controls, procedures and records of the Office of Data Processing (ODP) were, except as noted below, generally effective and in accordance with Agency regulations. Prior audit recommendations were satisfactorily resolved, with the exception of two that pertain to disaster recovery and tape check out controls. This report includes comments and recommendations concerning:

- developing a disaster recovery plan;
- strengthening controls over the check out of tapes;
- conducting annual tape inventories;
- maintaining the Tape Management Catalog;
- improving mini disk access controls; and
- strengthening control and administration of ODP's Wang equipment and lease/purchase equipment.

Other administrative matters, including formalizing delinquent advance follow-up procedures and resolving audit inventory discrepancies, were discussed with responsible officials and satisfactorily resolved during the audit.

2. As requested by the Director of Data Processing, we provided comments to him concerning the Agency's vulnerability to external and internal computer penetration, as well as ODP's commitment to a unique VM environment and GIMS as the primary data base management system.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

3. The audit included a review of administrative functions to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures and to assure compliance with Agency regulations. Financial and logistical transactions

were tested to determine whether documentation, approvals and certifications were in accordance with applicable accounting and reporting requirements and to ensure that expenditures were within the scope of authorized activities.

4. The audit also included reviews and tests in the Ruffing, Northside, and Special Computer Centers to determine whether established procedures and other documentation were sufficient, adequate and followed to provide effective operations and to protect against potential security and safety risks.

BACKGROUND

25X1 5. ODP provides a central computer service for Agency components and other Intelligence Community requirements as assigned and has a personnel ceiling of [] responsible for:

- reviewing and coordinating Agency proposals for the acquisition of computer hardware (including word processing equipment), software, and services;
- operating five computer centers (Ruffing, Special, 4C, W2, and Northside) that provide facilities and services for batch and interactive computer processing, data base management, and online information storage and retrieval;
- developing and implementing application systems; and
- performing maintenance and production control of completed application programs.

25X1 6. The ODP operating budget of [] for Fiscal Year 1984 is summarized in the attached exhibit.

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DETAILED COMMENTS

Disaster Recovery Plan

8. ODP still needs to develop a comprehensive disaster recovery plan as recommended in the prior three audits. A plan is needed to minimize the length and magnitude of service interruption in an emergency situation. Although ODP had accepted the prior recommendations and intends to eventually develop such a plan, it has not done it due to other priorities. Because of Agency dependence on data processing, the plan should identify priority applications, alternative computer centers and other matters to consider in emergency situations. While ODP is already aware of many of the actions to take in an emergency, a comprehensive contingency plan is still important to ensure a practical and testable program with resource constraints.

ILLEGIB

Recommendation #1: Develop and maintain a comprehensive disaster recovery plan.

Tape Check Out Control

9. ODP accepted but still needs to implement a prior audit recommendation to use the security control software package, Access Control Facility 2 (ACF2), to verify individual authority to remove ODP tapes from the various computer centers. At present anyone with a valid badge can check out an ODP tape by merely identifying the reel number and dataset name. ACF2 would improve security by matching a user's identity to its information that authorizes check out privileges. ODP already uses ACF2 to control the removal of certain non-ODP tapes and will soon use it to control tape access from VM. It could also be used to control all tapes subject to withdrawal. ODP tapes have not been accorded this control because they are not withdrawn as often as the tapes presently controlled by ACF2. While responsible officials had agreed with the prior recommendation, other priorities apparently have prevented its timely implementation.

ILLEGIB

Recommendation #2: Use ACF2 to verify authorization to check out ODP tapes.

Annual Tape Inventory

10. The Ruffing Center Tape Library should retain evidence of its tape inventories to document compliance with ODP policy requiring annual inventories. According to library officials an inventory was taken in February 1983, although they could only locate documentation dated June 1981. They apparently misplaced the 1983 documentation and did not take an inventory

in 1982. Inventories consist of reconciling automated inventory listings to physical tapes and resolving discrepancies to ensure adequate tape controls. An inventory was in progress during the audit but it had not been reconciled because of unresolved discrepancies. Responsible officials agreed to conduct inventories in the future as required and to retain evidential documentation.

Recommendation #3: Conduct annual tape inventories and retain applicable documentation for audit.

Tape Management Catalog

11. The Tape Management Catalog (TMC) is used to track the current status and location of tapes in ODP libraries. We noted that the TMC was not accurate in depicting the quantity or location of tapes because certain data fields have not always been maintained on a current basis or updated to reflect inventory results. Failure to maintain and update the TMC diminishes its value as a control and inventory tool.

Recommendation #4: Update and maintain the Tape Management Catalog.

Mini Disk Access Controls

12. ODP could strengthen controls to detect or prevent unauthorized access to individual or office mini disk files. By using the GOTO NAMES facility, some users presently could access more than 250 such mini disks which could contain links to additional disks. While present security practices include monitoring failed GOTO accesses, they sometimes do not include monitoring successful accesses. One way to improve control would entail requiring disk owners or ADP Control Officers to review automated listings of successful accesses to detect penetration of their respective files. Although ODP already makes such listings available, only about 25 percent of the users request them. Increasing users' awareness in this area and requiring their post review of access listings would be a practical way to improve security within present resource constraints.

13. Another, but more resource intensive way to improve security, would be to use VLINK, an automated facility that controls disk access based on written user authorizations submitted to ODP. Although using VLINK would involve changing all disk passwords and other setup problems, these initial costs would provide long-term security benefits. ODP agreed to consider appropriate procedures to improve mini disk access controls.

Recommendation #5: Improve mini disk access controls as discussed above.

Property Administration

14. ODP needs to comply with regulations and to improve procedures and records in its administration of Wang equipment and lease/purchase equipment.

25X1 15. ODP has omitted from its accountable property records Wang word processing and personal computer equipment valued at [] that has been acquired for its own use. ODP omitted such property because it has not designated a focal point officer to take custodial responsibility for the equipment, to sign a hand receipt, and to keep the ODP Logistics Branch informed on adjustments required in property records. The Logistics Branch needs such information since equipment transactions have been made directly with user offices. []

25X1 [] requires the maintenance of perpetual accountable property records to include prescribed documentation in support of acquisitions, dispositions and loans. It also requires the taking of annual inventories to confirm or appropriately adjust the records. The equipment has never been inventoried. ODP should strengthen procedures and internal controls to ensure safeguards over these assets and compliance with these regulations. To that end, ODP should consider appointing a Wang systems manager to operate as the focal point in these matters. ODP officials have agreed that improvements in Wang property administration are needed.

25X1 16. The ODP Logistics Branch has not updated, since October 1982, the informal records that are required by [] to facilitate control over in-use equipment that will be bought under lease/purchase contracts. Consequently, these records understate by approximately [] the value of equipment that is presently being acquired under such contracts. We also noted that [] of equipment purchased under lease/purchase contracts has not been picked up on the formal accountable property records. This causes related understatements in property values that ODP annually reports to the Office of Finance for inclusion in the Agency's financial accounts. Hand receipts also are not being used to control this equipment.

25X1 17. Responsible officials have deferred updating these formal and informal records due to other priorities and resource constraints. They indicate that they plan to perform the updates in the new automated property system recently implemented to satisfy these and other recordkeeping requirements. The ODP Resource Acquisitions Management Staff (RAMS) should be in a position to assist the Logistics Branch in strengthening control over its lease/purchase property. RAMS maintains an automated data base which includes information on

the status of lease/purchase property. The Logistics Branch could use such information to update and reconcile its required records and improve property administration.

Recommendation #6: Conduct an inventory of Wang equipment and update the accountable property records accordingly.

Recommendation #7: Update and maintain the formal and informal records of lease/purchase equipment.

Recommendation #8: Establish Consolidated Memorandum Receipt accounts for in-use property.

Recommendation #9: Reconcile lease/purchase information in the Logistics Branch to data in the Resource Acquisition Management Staff.

Recommendation #10: Appoint a Wang systems manager.

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Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP90-00992R000100040001-6

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Report of Audit of Office of Data Processing
For the Period 1 May 1982 - 31 May 1984

ODP-84-1607

FROM:

Audit Staff
1201 Key

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. IG 6 E 18 HQS.

10/26

[Signature]

2.

3.

Director, Data
Processing 2 D0105

29 OCT 1984

4.

L-10

5.

DD

6.

7.

8.

9.

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11.

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